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INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY li.ND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
by 
John 0. Ledyard 
It is by now reasonably well known that when inf orma­
tionally decentralized processes are used to make collective choice 
decisions or to allocate resources, individuals may find it in their 
interest to distort the information tney provide and that these dis-
tortions may lead to non-optimal group decisions. In the social 
choice context, this has been formalized in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
Theorem [2, 14] which states that all non-dictatorial rules will have 
this property. In a different context, Hurwicz [7] has shown that 
there is a private goods neo-c.lassical exchange economy such that any 
decentralized mechanism which selects Pareto-optimal allocations and 
which has a no- t rade option will have this property. Roberts [13) has 
provided a similar example in the public goods context. Other work 
(e.g., Green-Laffont [3], Groves-Loeb [4], Hurwi�z [8] and Walker [15]) 
indicates that, for mechanisms designed to select efficient outcomes, 
in most environments some agent will have an incentive to misrepre:..ent 
his informat ion and thus to manipulate the mechanism. All these 
results lead one to the conjecture that it is almost impossible to 
design any mechanism for group decisions which is compatible with 
individual incentives and efficiency. 
One possible way out of this dilemma can be identified by 
looking at the implicit informa�ional assumptions behind the theorems 
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concerning the impossibility of incentive compatibility: In particular, 
it is usually assumed that individuals have enough information, or can 
collect enough, to be able to compute an appropriate manipulative 
response . In general, this involves complete knowledge of the alloca-
tion mechanism and of the responses of the other individuals. One 
might conjecture that with less information individuals may be reluctant 
to misrepresent their input to the mechanism since they. cannot be sure 
of achieving gains. Thus, some form of incentive compatibility might 
occur under more realistic informational assumptions. Countering this 
conjecture is the argument that finding a response which is better than 
the truthful response for an individual need· not involve any infor�ation 
about the others at all. To see this, suppo·se that all consumers have 
chosen their respons es but one is allowed to vary his while the others 
keep theirs fixed. If there is a better strategy for this individual, 
one would expect that he would eventually find it. If one accepts this 
view of strategy selection then the theorems above apply independently 
of any assumptions about initial information. However, we would argue 
that the individual who finds his manipulation in this fashion is 
getting something for free since he is never penalized for choices 
which are worse for him than the truth. 
In this paper, we examine the impact on the incentive com-
patibility of a mechanism of two assumptions: (1) each individual 
possesses incomplete information and (2) each individual must select 
his representation before he can gather further information and once 
this strategy is selected, he may not revise it. Thus, a·bad selection 
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is penalized. These assumptions seem to be the most favorable condi-
tions for attaining incentive compatibility of some mechanisms even 
though they are not incentive compatible under complete information. 
However, our conclusion will be. that the introduction of complete 
information alters none of the incentive properties of most mechanisms. 
In particular, we will establish two general propositions. In section 
2.B we show that an allocation mechanism (social choice function) is
incentive compatible under incomplete information if and only if it is 
incentive compatible under complete information. In section 2C we show 
that a differentiable allocation mechanism will lack incentive compati-
bility in most environments under complete information only if it lacks 
incentive compatibility under incomplete information in most environments 
for most prior beliefs. 
We begin in Section 1 by introducing the standard model of 
behavior under complete information. In Section 2A we extend the model 
to behavior with incomplete information. In Section 2B we characterize 
the situations in which mechanisms are incentive compatible under 
incomplete information. In Section 2C we characterize the situations 
in .which the lack of incentive compatibility under incomplete information 
is generic. Section 3 contains some concluding remarks about the rela-
tionship of these results to others in the literature. 
1. Complete Information 
* 
A. Abstract Allocation Mechanisms 
An allocation mechanism is often described formally by a 
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communication process (a language and a collection of response rules) 
and an outcome rule describing how equilibrium messages get translated 
into allocations. (See, e.g., Hurwicz [6] or Reiter [12].) Since much 
.of this usual description is unnecessary for the analysis in this 
paper, I will abstract entirely from the details and will formalize an 
allocation mechanism as a mapping from environments to allocations. 
To be more precise an (economic) environment is 
e = { I,A,e1, . • .  ,en} where I is the index set of n agents (indexed, 
l, . . •  ,n), A is the space of feasible al1ocations and ei is the i 
characteristic of the ith agent.t Included in ei is a description of 
i's preferences, ::: ·( e i) , over the space of allocations. Throughout 
this paper, once I and A are chosen, they will no longer be allowed 
to vary. · Thus one can, I hope without confus ion , let Ei be the space 
of possible characteristics for agent i and let E = E1x ... xEn be the 
space of all environments (given I and A). An environment is e s  E. 
"' 
We use the phrase "allocation mechanism" throughout this paper. 
However, one can just as eas.ily read "social choice function" or 
"collective decision rule" without any difficulty .. 
t
ln a pure exchange environment, n is the number of consumers 
(agents), A is the set of joint net trades which add up to zero, and 
ei includes a description of i's preferences. 
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Now given an environment, an allocation mechanism selects a 
* feasible allocation, that is, an allocation mechanism is a function , 
¢, from E to A, where ¢ (e) E A is the allocation selec ted when the 
environment is e. 
* 
Certain kn own mechanisms, such as the competitive process, may be 
set valued for some environments. However, I would argue that these are 
incompletely specified since ultimately only a single allocation can 
occur. Thus, a complete version of the c9mpetitive process would include 
the rule for selection of the allocation from the set of Walrasian 
allocations. If such a rule is a ·  random device, then the complete 
mechanism selects gambles over the space of net trades, T .  I n  this 
case, by letting A be the space of probability measures on T, M(T), 
one is back to our framework where the mechanism is a function from 
E to A =  M(T). This method is used in [9]. 
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B. Incentive Compatibility 
The key notion behind incentive compatibility and the potential 
lack thereof , is the idea that the allocation mechanism cannot recognize 
the difference between an agent ' s true characteristic and his reported 
characteristic. In fact , the mechanism operates only to map reported 
characteristics into allocations. Thus, an agent, capable of taking 
full advantage of this fact, might be able to manipulate -the mechanism, 
by reporting a false characteristic, and thereby leave himself better 
off than if he reported his true characteristic. A mechanism for which 
no agent can gain in this manner is called incentive compatible .  
i _ 1 i i+l n More formally, let Z = E x . . •  xE x E x . . .  x E (the n-1. 
Cartesian product of the other agents' spaces "of characteristics). We 
will use the vectors\e and ( ei, z
i
) interchangeably. No confusion 
should occur. We can now state 
Definition 1 : [Hurwicz ] .(a) An allocation mechanism ¢:E +A is 
incentive compatible for i in e E E if and only if Q (e i , z i) = 
Q (e) � (ei) ¢( si,zi) for all si E Ei. (That is, the outcome if i 
. i > i reports e is at least as preferred under his true preferences, - (e ) , 
to any he could achieve through manipulation.) 
( b) An allocation mechanism �:E +A is inceniive compatible 
on BS:. E if and only if¢ is incentive compatible for i in e for all 
e E B and all i = 1, . . . , n. 
This definition is that introduced by Hurwic z [7] and is 
equivalent to non-manipulability of social choice functions. 
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2. Incomplete Information 
A. Model and Definitions 
The simplest way to model the incentive problem of an agent 
who lacks complete information and who must choose his representation, 
sis Ei, without recourse is to assume that i has some prior beliefs 
about the parameters he does not know and cannot control. One especially 
compelling model of this type can be found in Harsayani [SJ. The model 
we use is adapted from his. Other applications of his model to incentive 
issues can be found in [l] and (11]. 
i We broaden the interpretation of an agent ' s characteris tic', e ' 
to include not only preferences and endowments but also beliefs about the 
er.vironment and allocation mechanism. Thus, associated with each ei s Ei 
* 
is a probability measure on E representing i's prior beliefs. More 
formally, we make the following assumption which will be maintained 
; 
throughout this paper. Remember that Z� 1 P i-1 i+l n E x .. . x � x E x . . .  x E .
Assumpti�>n A .. 0: For each i = 1., 8 ... , n, 
(a) Zi is endowed with a Hausdorff topology. M(Zi) is the space 
of all probability measures on (z\ B(Zi)) where B(Zi) is the set of
Borel subsets of Zi. M(Zi) is endowed with the topology of weak con-
verg2r1.'.:>2 � The above also applies to A and M(A). 
(b) Hitb each ei E Ei is associated a bounded, measurable (Von 
'.�eumann-Horgenstern) utility function, u( • ,e i), such that if µ, µ1
. 
s M(A) 
are -CX·/O rar:dom gambles over allocations in A then i prefers µ
1 
to µ if 
1'As in Harsayani, these priqrs can be beliefs about what others 
believe about others' b e l iefs about etc. 
and only if f ui(a,ei) dµ1 >f ui(a,ei) dµ. 
'(c) With each ei s E
i 
is associated a unique element n s M(Zi) 
representing i's beliefs. We let the function Wi : E
i + M(Zi) 
summarize this association. The space �i of all such functions 
is endowed with the product topology. 
(d) We consider only those allocation mechanisms 9:E +A which 
are measurable on Z
i 
for all i. 
Using this assumption we can now broaden the definition of
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incentive compatibility to cover situations with incomplete information. 
Definition 2: (a) An allocation mechanism is said to be 
incentive compatible in e given b 1. f 0 h 1i1 - (01 e ie s , , w ere 't' : , • 8 � :. \µ
n
) : :Lf 
and only if, for i 1, .. e � '  n, f i i i i i i u [ <!J ( e , z ) , e ] dW ( e ) 2: 
f ui if> i i i ri i i [�(s ,z ),e] dY (e ) for all s s Ei.
(That is, no i can have an expect ed utility from reporting truthfully 
which is lower than that achieved through some misrepresentation.) 
(b) An allocation mechanism is said to be incentive compatible 
on B c;_E x �(where�= �l x . . .  x �n) if and only if 9 is incentive 
compatible in e given � for all (e,�) s B. 
Remark: Definition 2 represents a true broadening of Definition 1 
since M( Zi) includes measures with mass concentrated or1 singJ.c points. 
Let nii s M(Zi) be the measure such that nli ({zl}) = l. Let z z 
-, r _, ,e ; 
nii. Then <!i is incentive compatible in (ei ,zi) if anci only if 9 is z 
incentive compatible in e given wi. Thus, incentive compatibility on 
E x � implies incentive compatibility on E. Note, however, that 
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incentive compatibility in e given � for all e E E does not necessarily 
imply incentive compatibili�y in E. 
Remark: One can easily argue that the model of incomplete informa-
tion does not allow for enough uncertainties which i may face. For 
example, it is possible that i may not know how reported characteristics 
are transformed into allocations. That is, he may not understand 
completely how the allocation mechanism works. This additional uncer-
tainty can be modeled by introducing another random variable, x, beliefs 
about x, yi E H(X), and a mapping ii>:· E x X + A. Then i's expected 
utility from reporting si, if e
i is his true characteristic, is 
Let 
ff ui(�(si,zi,x), ei) �Yi dwi (ei). 
i. i i i 
v (s ,z ,e ) i i i i i - u (<P(s ,z ,x), e) dy and let 
( i i i i i i i v (s ,z ,e ) dw (e ) replace 
J J i i i i i i u (W(s ,z ), e )  d� (e ) in 
definition 2. None of the results reported in this paper would be 
altered by this procedure. Thus we will ignore uncertainty about the 
allocation mechanism. 
Remark: Returning to section 1 for a moment, one notes that the 
definition of incentive compatibility (definition l) could be naturally 
recast in game theoretic terms. Assume ui(a,ei) represents the 
ordering� (ei). Then¢ is incentive compatible for i in e if and 
only if ei is i's best replay to zi for the payoff function 
i ( i i i) i r �I i l) i] n., • • • • • v s ,z ,e = u t'l'\S ,z , e . Thus, "' is incentive compatible in e 
* . 
if and only if e is a Nash equilibrium of the game with players 
. i i i i i i = l, . • •  ,n, strategy sets E and payoffs v (s ,z ,e) = 
ui[�(si,z
i
),ei]. A natural generalization of this to an incomplete 
information game is found in Harsayani [5 ] .  There, strategies are 
functions S
i 
: Ei + Ei and a Bayes equilibrium in e given � is a 
vector of strategies ($1, . . . ,$n) such that Si(ei) solves for each i 
i i 
and all e E E the problem 
s
im�xE
i J ui[�(si, 8)i((e), ei} d �i(ei). 
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Thus, ii> is incentive compatible in e given W if and only if the identity 
i i 
map, 8 (e ) ei for all i and ei E Ei, is a Bay·es Equilibrium in e 
given w. 
Remark: In Harsayani [5] and other papers, a consisten cy hypo-
thesis is sometimes used. In particular , it is sometimes assumed that 
for each i and e E E, 1Ji1cei) =IT (• j ei) where IT E M(E) and IT(• I ei) 
is the regular conditional probability measure on zi given e1 and IT. 
We will look at restrictions like this below. For now one should only 
note that the model does not rule out considerations of consistency. 
B. Characterizations 
We now turn to a collection of results whi'ch characterize the 
incentive compatability of an allocation mechanism under incomplete 
information in terms of the incentive properties of that mechanism under 
* 
It is easy to see that this definition of incentive compatibility 
is equivalent to the requirement that ei be a dominant strategy for i in 
e for all e E E and all i. 
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complete information. As we will see, if the spaces of environments 
and expectat ions are broad enough, incentive compatibility under 
incomplete information obtains if and only if incentive compatibility 
obtains under complete info rmation . 
Th e o rem 1: An allocation mechanism � : E + A is incentive 
compatible in E x 'l' if and only if � is incentive compatible on E. 
Pr oof: (if) If� is not incentive compatible on Ex 'l', there 
is (e,ijl) s E x 'l', some i, and some si s E
i 
'such that 
f i i i i i i J i i i i i i 
u [�(s ,z ),e] dijl (e ) > u [ �(e ,z ),e] dijl (e ). 
Therefore, there is an i, (ei,z
i
) s Ei, and sis Ei such that 
i ["" ( i i) i l 
i ["" ( i i) i l - "" . 
. . 
u � s ,z , e > u � e ,z , e . Thus, � is not incentive 
compatible on E which is a contradiction. 
* 
(only if) Suppose � is not incentive compatible in e 
Then there 
. i i i i �'Ci *i are i ands s E such that u [�(s , z· ) , e ] > 
i * '"i * *i '"i i i 
u [�(e ),e ] where e = (e ,z ). Let ijJ s 'l' be such that ijJ (e) 
for all ei where µi({z*i}) = 1. ThenJ ui[�(si,zi),e*il dijli(e*i) 
( i i i *i i I u [9(s ;z ),e ] dµ 
J 
i *i i *i i *i *i *i 
u [�(e ,z ), e ] > u [�(e ,z ),e ] 
s E. 
i 
= µ. 
( < *i i *i i *� J u·[�(e ,z ),e ] dl/! (e �). Thus 9 is not incentive compatible in 
E x ·'i' which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
An obvious corollary can be stated which indicates that one 
does not need incentive compatibility on all of E x 'l' to ensure incentive 
compatibility ori E. This will be a r�curring theme in this paper. 
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Corollary 1.1: An allocation mechanism � : E + A is incentive com-
. * patibl
_
e on E if and only if � is incentive compatible on E x 'l' , where 
* . . 
ijJ s 'l' S 'l' if and only if ijl1 is a constant function on E1 for i = 1, 
The force of this theorem and its corollary is thao:·.if a 
. . .  , n. 
mechanism is not incentive compatible under complete information then it 
will also lack incentive compatibility under incomplete information. Thus, 
the conjecture that the introduction of in complete information �ight lead 
to incentive compatibility, even if it did not obtain under complete 
information, is shown to be false . 
Two objections can be raised at this point which we will 
consider in sequence . To prove Theorem 1, one uses the obvious fact 
that if � is not incentive compatible for i in e and if i thinks the 
environment is e (with probability 1) then � will still not be incentive 
compatible for i under "incomplete information ." It can be fairly said 
that, in requiring incentive compatibility for priors concentrated on 
single environments, we have not retained the spirit behind the intro-
duction of incomplete information and that we should only consider priors 
* 
which are·more diffuse. 
As it turns out, if we are willing to consider only a slightly 
narrower class of environments and mechanisms, then the result of Theorem 1 
still holds even if we restrict priors to be diffuse. To capture the idea 
of diffuseness . +( i) c ( i) i we consider a set M Z - M Z of measures . on Z 
* . . . Usually a measure is diffuse ifµ ({z1}) = 0 for all z1 s 21• 
Our notion will also require additional properties. 
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which can be represented by a continuous, positive density function. 
Ttiat is, n s M+(Zi) if and only if there is a continuous function 
i i i i h : Z + IR such that (a) h(z ) > 0 for all z s Z and (b) for any 
i 
J i i i . + Borel subset B S Z , n(B) = h (z ) dz . We will let '¥ £ 'Ji be the 
set of expectations functionsB� whose range is confined to M+(Zi) for 
i each � • 
Up to now we have only required that Zi be a Hausdorff 
topological space. There may be many such Zi for which M+(Zi) is empty. 
' . * Th.us, to ensure that M-r (Z1) f r/J we will make the following assumption 
when dealing with M+(Zi). 
Assumption A.l: (2) As;,JRK ( K- dimensional Euclidean Space) 
and Ei c fR� for i = l, .. . , n where Kand Mare finite positive integers. 
(b) For all i, either Ei = IRM or O < J dei < oo. 
An example of A and E satisfying A.l is the class o.f neo-
classical exchange environments with log linear utility functions. There 
are also many others. Under A.i, M+(Zi) f l/J since if Ei = lRM, the multi­
variate normal on JR(n-l)M belongs to M+(Zi) and if 0 < J . dei < oo then 
Ei . + . the uniform density on Zi is in M (Zi). 
The next assumption is used occasionally throughout the rest of 
this paper. 
Assumption A.2: (a) For each i 
on A x  Ei. 
(b) <Ii ·is continuous on E. 
1 i( i) . 
, • • .  , n, u a,e is continuous 
We can now state and prove the following corollary which is 
used to support the statement that requiring diffuseness does not blunt the 
impact of Theorem 1. 
* 
The assumption A.l could be weakened at the cost of some confusion. 
14 
Corollary 1.2: Under assumptions A.l and A. 2, an allocation 
+ . 
mechanism � : E + A is incentive compatible on E x 'Ji if and only if � 
is 1ncentive compatible on E. 
Proof: (if) Follows from the "if" stat ement of Theorem 1 since 
'¥+£ '¥. 
(only if) 
* 
If � is not incentive compatible in e , there are i and 
i. i s E E such that 
(1) 
i i *i *i i * *i * *i *i 
u [�(s , z ) , e ] > U [�(e ), e ] where e = (e , z ). 
We consider two cases. Case (1) f i dzi < oo By assumption A.2, (1) 
z. *' 
holds on an open.neighborhood, N, of z i One·can choose a continuoup 
function h:Zi +IR such that h(z
i
) > 0 if zi s ·N, h(zi) = 0 otherwise, and 
J . 
* . 
hdzi < oo (by Urysohn' s Lemma). Let. h0 : Z i + IR be 
* i  i i i  i * 
h0 (z ) = h(z ) + 
o for all z s z . Let g0(z ) = h0 
defined by 
i J i (z ) Io· dz , 
* . . J . * let g (zi) = g0 (zi) I g 0d zi. Then if o > 0, g0 is continuous, 
and 
g� (zi) > 0 for all zi s Zi and J g� dzi 1. Let n� s 1.t (Zi), be defined,, 
i * 
for all Borel sets B £ Z , by n0 (B) 
( 1, i i *i . i+ 
J
B g0 (z ) dz , and let·�;0 s •r be 
*i 
given by �o (e
i) 
* i i ( .i i i *i ' *i *i 
n0 for all e s E • Now J u [�(s ,z ) ,e ] a-t)i0 (e ) 
J ui[�(si,zi),e*i] g� dZi = c • J i i i *i * i u [�(s ,z ) ,e ]h0 dz , where c > O, 
which is equal to o • c • f ui[�(si,zi), e*i1 dzi + 
( i i i *i i 
c • ju [�(s ,z ), e ] hdz . 
N 
.Similarly, f i *i i *i *i *i 
u [�(e ,z ) , e ] dw (e ) 
e • c · ·  u [� e ,z ) , e ] dz + c J i 
*i i *i i 
J
r ui[ 
N 
*' i *i 
(e ... , z ) , e ] 
By (1) and continuity and choice of N, 
J u
i[¢(s
i
,z
i), e*il hdz
i > f ui[¢(e*i,zi), e*i] hdzi. 
N N 
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Therefore for 6 small enough (since c < oo and ui bounded) ¢ is not incentive 
* *" 
compatible for i in e given 1/J01, which is a contradiction. 
Case (2): Ei =!RM. Let f� : E
h+ IR be the multivariate normal with 
mean e*h and variance-covariance matrix or where 6 > 0 and I is the identity 
* i 1 l i-1 i-1 i+l i+l n n 
matr:;.x. Let g6(z ) = f6(e ) x . . •  x f6 (e ) xf6 (e ) x . . •  x 
f6 (e ) . 
It is easy to show, following case (1), that for 6 small enough, 
* *" 
�is not incentive compatible in e given w6
1 
(defined as in case (1)) which 
is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Remark: While the proof is somewhat tedious, the basic idea is 
*" 
simply to stack enough probability on a small enough neighborhood of 
z 1 in 
such a way that the prior belongs to M+(Zi). Then, with sufficient continuity, 
even though i considers all z
i possible, he thinks the probability that z
i s N 
*" . 
is close to 1 and, therefore, that he can gain by misrepresenting e 1 as s1• 
One must thus conclude that the introduction of diffuse incomplete information 
alters none of the incentive properties of continuous mechanisms in environme�ts 
with continuous preferences. 
Remark: As before , Corollary 1.2 remains valid if '¥+ is replaced 
with'¥+ n '¥*, the set of functions which take a constant value in M+(Zi) for 
each i. As we will see below (Corollary 1.3) the set '¥+can be restricted 
even further. 
The second objection which can be raised against Theorem 1. 
is that no consistency is required of the agents' expectations. It is 
usually argued that consistency is a long-run phenomenon (after learning 
has occured). Under this interpretation, consistent agents have more· 
information than inconsistent agents and, therefore, a lack of incentive 
compatibility should be more prevalent. Whether this is true or not, 
consistency is a natural restriction in the context of the Harsayani 
game model and should be considered. 
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We will say an expectations function 1/! s '¥ is consistent if 
there is IT s M(E) such that, for i = 1, • . .  , N, 1/Ji (ei) IT(· l ei) where 
IT(•jei) is the regular conditional probability �easure over Zi given 
ei and IT. We let � be the set of consistent 1/J s '¥. 
Corollary 1.3: Under assumptions A.l and A.2, an allocation mechanism 
* + ¢:E+A is incentive compatible on E x (� n '¥ ) if and only if ¢ is incentive 
compatible on E. 
Proof: (if) Since� n '¥+ S '¥, this follows directly from Theorem 1. 
(only if) 
* 
Suppose ¢ is not incentive compatible in e . Let 
*" 
w61 be as constructed in the proof of corollary 1.2. ¢is not incentive 
*i *i 
compatible in e give4 w6 for 6 small enough, 6 > 0 .  It remains to 
r.T *i i i i i show that '1 IT s M(E) such that �16 (e ) = ITC• Je ) for all e s E and 
I 
i + h h h such that IT(• e ) s M (Z ) for all e s E • i i Let g :E + IR be any 
continuous, positive density function on Ei. * i Let g6: Z + IR be as in 
. . * . 
Corollary 1.2. Finally let G(e) = g1(e1) • g6(z1) for all e s E.  
Define IT s M+(e) by, for each Borel subset B S  E ,  IT(E) = JBG(e)de. 
Let
. 
1/Jh(eh) = IT C· I eh). Then, 1/! E � n '¥+ and� is not incentive 
* 
compatible at e given 1/J which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
*we chose � n '¥+ instead of � since if the corollary is valid on 
� n '¥+·, then it is valid on RE and since 1/J E � n '¥+ if and only if 
beliefs are consistent in the sense of [l, p. 24]. 
17 
Remark: Corollary 1.3 remains valid if � n Y+ is replaced with* 
� n y+ n y*. This is shown directly from the proof if Eh= !Rm for all 
h since then G(e) is composed of ind ependently distributed multivariate 
normals. And if the e
h are independently distributed for some continuous 
+ * 
pos itive density G(e), then the t/! derived will belong to � n Y n Y . 
( . 
* 
If 
J 
dz1 < oo, as in the case (1) of Corollary 1.2, then a different g0 
. h 
must be produced which has the .property that the e , (h # i), are 
,independently distributed. This can be done by decomposing the neighbor-
hood N into neighborhoods Nh for h = 1, • • •  :t n, h # i such that 
1 i-1 n � . 
N x • • •  x N x . • .  x N :=. N. Then one follows the same procedure as in 
'"h corollary 1.2 to construct g0' for h = 1, . . •  , n, and n # i. Let 
. *l 1 '"n n *i i G(e) = g0 (e) x • . .  x g0 (e) where g0 (e) is essentially arbitrary. 
Then the derived t/! belongs to � n r+n y* and �is not incentive 
* 
compatible in e given t/J. 
Remark: Given the validity of corollary 1.3 for 
RE n 'l'+ n r* :: I<;;;;_ '¥, the validity of Corollary 1.1, 1. 2, 
* + and 1.3 follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that IS Y , I<;;. Y , and 
IS � n '¥+. In fact, one can easily show that if IS BS '¥+, then 
under A.l and A.2, � is incentive compatible on E if and only if � 
is incentive c ompatible on E x B. There are undoubtedly smaller sets 
than I which have this property. It is easy to prove the following: 
* 
Requiring 
that there are, 
on Ei such that 
.+ * that t/J s R.,.., n '¥ n '¥ is equivalent to the requirement 
c . 
for i = 1, . . . , n, continuous positive densities, g1, 
iJ;\ei) (A) = 
j( 1 1, i-1 i-1 i+l i+l n n i 
A
g (e J x . • •  x g (e ) x g (e ) x . . •  x g (e )dz • 
Compare this to the conc ept of "ind ependence " defined in [l, p. 24]. 
Lemma 1: Suppose � is incentive compatible on E if and only if 
� is incentive compatible on Ex QG Ex Y, and suppose that 
Q <;BS Y. Then� is incentive compatible on E if and only if� is 
incentive compatible on E x B. 
The converse is not necessarily true . 
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Remark: One subset of environments which is of part icular interest 
to social choice theorists occurs when the sets A and Ei are restricted 
* 
to be finite. E
i 
is usually the set of all profiles (subsets of A x A) 
on A and is thus finite if A is. Let EF be this·-set of environments. 
Since EF and A are finite, the only Hausdorf topology is the discrete 
topology (all subsets are both open and closed). Thus all functions 
from E to A are continuous and all functions from A x Ei to IR are 
continuous. Thus if A.O holds then A.l(a) and A.2 also do. Finally, 
since Ei can be parameterized such that Ei S IR, f dei = the cardinality 
of Ei which is finite so A.l(b) holds. Thus, Theorem 1 and all its 
corollaries apply when E is replaced by E
F
. In fact, the proofs are 
easier since n s M+(Zi) if and only if there are positive numbers P 
z 
for each z such that n(B) = E P2 , since under the discrete 
zsB 
topology, any assignment of probabilities to the finite set Zi 
is continuous. For example, let n(B) = cardinality of B/cardinality 
of Z
i
. Then n 8 M+(Zi). 
.One can summarize the results of this section in a single 
sentence. In spite of restrictions with respect to diffuseness, 
* 
This is the case for which Gibbard [2] and Satterthwaite [14} 
show that � is incentive compatible in E if and only if � is dictatorial. 
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independence, or finite alternatives, if the set of possible expecta-
tions is broad enough and preferences are continuous, a continuous 
allocation mechanism is incentive compatible under incomplete informa-
tion if and only if it is incentive compatible under complete informa-
tion. Since most of the mechanisms we know of are not incentive com-
patible under comp lete information, we are left with the unpleasant 
fact that ;nos(; of the mechanisms we know of will not be incentive 
* 
corrrpatible under incomplete infmmation. 
C. Generic Properties 
It has been demonstrated that an allocation mechanism which 
lacks incentive compatibility under complete information also lacks 
incentive compatibility under incomplete information for some prior 
beliefs. One might next ask for how many priors is this true. If 
there are only a few, then there is some hope that incentive compati-
bility could be rescued with the introduction of incomplete information. 
As we will see, however, the set of priors leading to a lack of incen-
tive compatibility is large. In particular, if there is j ust one 
environment (ei, z1) in which W is not incentive compatible for i then 
0 is not incentive compatible for i on an open dense subset of prior 
beliefs given e-� 
We first show <::hat, for continuous preferences, mechanisms, 
and expe.ctat ions functions, incentive compatibility is a closed property .. 
*This appears to be at odds with the results in [l]. For a 
discussion of this nparadoxn, see the last section of this papere 
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Theorem 2: Under assumption A.2 , 
(a) an allocation mechanism <li:E-+A is incentive compatible on a 
closed subset (possibly empty) of E, 
(b) an allocation mechanism <li:E-+A is incentive compatible on a 
(relatively*> closed subset of E x '¥c, where y s '¥c if and only if 1}! is a 
continuous function. 
Proof: (a) Suppose <Ji is not incentive compatible for some i in 
i i (e ,z ) E E. Then there is s i E Ei such that u i [9(si
 ,zi), ei ] > 
i i i i u [qi(e ,z ) , ei]. But u and qi are continuous. Therefore, the inequality 
holds on an open neighb9rhood of (ei,zi). The conclusion follows easily. 
f-:. 
(b) Suppose qi is not incentive compatible in e given ·i/J for some 
* (e , y) s Ex '¥c. Then there are i and si s Ei such that 
f ui[W(si,zi), e*i] di}!i (e*i) > 
f ui[<li(e*i,zi), e*i] dyi(e*i). 
Now ui is continuous and bounded, W is continuous, and is continuous. 
Further, in the topology of weak convergence on M(Zi), n ->- n if and 
only if f fdn -+ f fdn for all continuous bounded :Eunctiom1ls. f. 
*i i Let f(e ,z ) i i i 
*i i *i i *i � u [W(s ,z ),e J - u [ (e ,z ),e ] • .ct follows 
,, 
easily that there is a relatively open neighborhood N o:E (e ,y) where 
c ,, N <;; E x '¥ such that if (e,�J ) E N then ( i i .*i i 
J :E(
e ,z ) dQ (e ) > 0. 
*B is a relatively closed set of A<:; E x '¥ if and only if B A n  C 
where C is a closed subset of Ex'¥. 
2 1  
The conclu s i on f ol l ows s ince 4> is n o t  in c ent ive c omp a t ib l e  o n  an o p en 
subset o f  E x  '¥c . Q . E . D .
C o r o llary 2 . 1 :  Un der a s sump t ion A . 2 ,  Theorem 2 ( a) i s  valid when 
any sub s e t  B c;;;; E r epl ace s  E and Theorem 2 (b )  is valid when any sub s e t
B S  E x  '¥ c r e p l a c e s  E x  '¥c . 
P r oo f :  F o l lows f r om Theorem 2 and the d e f init ion o f  relat ive
topology . Q . E . D ,  
* 
Remark :  S inc e the s e t  o f  c on s t an t  exp e c t at ion fun c t ions '¥ is 
c * 
a sub s e t  o f  '¥ , The orem 2 ap p l i e s  on sub s e t s  of E x '¥ • If 1j; d o e s  no t 
b e long to '¥ c ( i . e . , 1/ is n o t  c on t inuou s )  then small p e r turb at ions in 
e i c o u l d  c au s e  the inequality , f f ( e i , z i ) dij;i ( ei ) ,  t o  swit ch . Thu s 
Theor em 2 will n o t  n e c e s s ar i ly hold on sub s e t s  o f '¥ n o t  cont ained in '¥c . 
Examp l e s  o f  such b r o ad er s e t s  are � and '¥+ . However , the theorem will
hold (by the c or o l l ary) on '¥ c n � and '¥c n '¥+ . 
To e s tab lish cond i t i on s  under whi ch in cent ive c omp a t ib i l i t y
with incomp lete info rmat ion i s  a nowhere d en s e  p r o p er t y ,  w e  will need
t o  r e s t r i c t  further the c l a s s  o f  envir onment s and mechan i sms und er
con s ideration . 
As sump t ion A .  3 :  ( a )  A S  nf and , for each i 
where K and M are f in i t e  p o s i t ive int e g er s , 
i M l ,  . . .  , n , E s_ IR 
(b)  ¢ has cont inuous first  d e r ivat iv e s  in e on E and , f o r
each i = 1 ,  . . . , n ,  u
i 
h a s  cont inuous f i r s t  d e r ivat ive s  i n  a c A given 
i -; e on A x E- , 
(c )  for each i = 1 ,  . . .  , n and e ach (e i , z i )  c Ei x z i , 
L ,_ ,  i :i.)  i J  > i [ "'· (  i i )  i ]  i i 
. f  d " fu l � \ e , z  , e _ u � s , z  , e  f o r  a l l  s c E 1 an only 1. 
i i i i Vu • V .  <t> ( e , z ) = 0 whe r e  Vu 
1. 
i i ; _ ( 8u / 8 a1 ,  . . . , tlu 8 aK) ' 
V i<t> = . ( 8 4> / (l
e� , . • •  , 8 4> / 3 e iM) ,  and Vu
i 
V . ¢ ( e
i
, z i )  i s  the vector o f
1. 
p ar t ial d er ivat ive s o f  ui [ <t> ( s i , z i ) , e i ] with r e s p e ct t o  ( s� , • • •  , s�) 
evaluated at s i i e 
( d )  for each i i i 
. 
1 ,  . . . , n ,  f o r  each e c E ,  and for each 
n c M ( Z i ) , 
o f  z i . 
Vu
i 
• V . <t> ( e
i
, z
i
) I i s  b ound ed by an int e gr ab l e  funct ion
1. 
2 2  
An examp le o f  a c l a s s  o f  envir onment s (neo c l a s s i cal exchange 
with Cobb-Douglas u t i l ity)  and a mechanism ( the compet it ive pro c e s s )
whi ch s at i s f y  A . 3 i s  g iven i n  [ 9 ] . 
To char a c t e r i z e  s i tuat ions in wh ich inc ent ive comp a t ib il i t y  
is a nowhere d en s e  p r o p e r t y  we w i l l  need t o  d e f ine one mor e set . Let 
* 
Eq, = { e  c E I f o r  i = 1 ,  . . . , n ,  ¢ is incent ive c omp a t ib le f o r  i on 
{ ei } x Z i } .
A 
We n o t e  in p as s ing that i f Eq, is the set of e such that
* A 
¢ is inc ent ive comp at ib le in e ,  then E
¢ 
S Eq, and the in c lu s ion i s  
* A 
usually s t r i c t . In f a c t , Eq, may b e  emp ty even though Eq, is n o t . 
A * 
Als o  Eq, can be a d ens e sub s et of E wh i l e  Eq, is nowher e  dens e . 
Theorem 3 :  Und er as sumpt ion A . 3 ,  an allocat ion me chanism 
¢ : E+A i s  inc ent ive comp at ib l e  only on a nowhe r e  d en s e  sub s e t  of E x '¥ 
* 
if and only if Eq, is a nowhere d e n s e  sub s e t  o f  E .
* * 
P r o o f : ( only i f )  Let e c E Then by r e f e r r ing t o  the 
proof o f  the "if" s t at emen t o f  Theorem 1 it f o l l ows that <ll is incent ive 
* * 
c �mp at ib l e  in ( e  , ¢ ) f or all 1j; c '¥ . Let 1j; c '¥ .  By hyp othesis , f o r  any 
* * t ' 
neighborhood N S E x '¥ o f  (e , 1j; ) there .  is (e ,1}! ) c N such that ¢ is 
I I 
not incent ive comp a t i b l e  in e g iven 1j; • Thu s , again as in the p r o o f
of the " i f "  s t at emen t of Th eorem 1, it f o l l ows that t h e r e  is i ,  
i i ....i. i i [ ( i _i .. i l i [ ( .. i -i ) .. i l s E E , z E Z such tha� u ¢ s , z  ) , e > u ¢ e , z  , e  . 
.. * Thu s , e rt E • * Thu s , f o r  every n e ighb orhood N � E o f  e E E there
* * 
is e .. E N such that e .. rt E • This. e s t ab l i s h e s  the p r o p o s i t ion . 
( i f )  Supp o s e  ¢ is inc ent ive comp a t ib l e  for e g iven 1jJ whe r e
(e , ljJ) € E x � . By hyp oth e s i s , f o r  a n y  n e i ghb orhood N f;.  E x � o f
* 
( e , ljJ )  there is e E E such that e rt E ,  and ( e , ljJ )  E N .  I f  ¢ is not 
23 
in c ent ive c omp a t ib le i n  e g iven ljJ ,  we are through . If ¢ is incent ive
in e g iv en � .  we c an p e rturb 1jJ s l ight ly and d e s t roy the in c en t ive
comp a t ib i l i t y . 
* 
To s e e  t h i s , we n o t e  f ir s t  t hat s ince e rt E , there
is i,  and � E Zi  such that V'ui V . ¢ ( ei , z i ) f 0 [ b y  A . 3 ( c ) ) . Further , 
J_ 
if_ ¢ is incent ive compat ib l e  in e g iven ljJ ,  t hen again by A . 3  it i s
t r u e  that f V' u i V'i¢ ( e i , z i ) d� i ( ei ) = 0 . C on s id e r  the new exp e c t at ions 
fun c t ion ljJ� d e f ined f o r  each e i e E i , each Borel s e t  Bf;. Z i , and e ach 
s 2: 0 by , 
ljJ� ( ei ) ( B )  ( 1- o )  l)J i ( e i) ( B )
( 1- o )  l)J i ( e i ) ( B ) + o 
i 
if z- rt B 
i 
i f � E B
Clearly 6 + 0 implies �� + �i .  Fur the r , 
J i i i i Ai Vu V'i¢ ( e  , z  )d ljJ 0 ( e  ) (1 - o) vu i V . ¢ ( e i , z i) dljJ i ( e i) J_ 
+ o • V'ui V'i¢ (ei ,z-i ) = 0 V'u iV'i ¢ ( e
i
,zi ) f 0 f or all 0 > 0 .  
Thus f o r  any n e i ghborhood N o f  ( e , ljJ )  we c an cho o s e  6 sma l l  enough
(A ) - (A , j , l  i-1 , 1 , i  i+l n) . such that e , ljJ0 = e ,  � , • • •  , 1jJ , � 0 , 1jJ , • • •  , 1jJ s N and such 
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that ¢ is no t incent iv e comp a t ib l e  i n  e g iven ljJ .  The d e s ired conclu s ion 
f o llows . Q . E .D .
* 
C o r o l l ary 3 . 1 :  Under a s sump t ion A . 3 ,  E; is a n owhere d en s e
sub s e t  o f  E given t h e  allocat ion mechan i sm ¢ : E  + A i f  and only i f  ¢ i s
incent ive comp a t i b l e  only on a c l o s e d , nowhere d e n s e  sub s e t  o f  E x  �c . 
P r o·o f : C l o s edne s s  f o l l ows f r om Theo rem 2. Nowher e densen e s s  
f o l l ows a s  i n  Theorem 3 by no t ing that i f  ljJ i E � iC then �io E � i C  s in c e
t h e  perturbat ion emp loyed d o e s  n o t  d e s troy cont inuity . _ Q . E . D . 
Remark : One con c lu d e s  from t h e s e  r e s u l t s  t h at , with enough 
d if ferent iab il i t y , i f  the l a ck of in c ent ive comp a t ib i l i t y is g eneric
f o r ¢ in E then · i t  i s  also gener i c  in E x  �c . Al s o  even i f  lack of 
* 
inc ent ive c ompat ib i lity is not gen e r i c  in E ,  if E is nowhere dens e ,  
then the set o f  exp e c t a t ions and env ironmen t s  on whi ch ¢ lacks in cent ive 
c ompat ib ility is s t ill large ( the set contain s  an o p en d e n s e  sub s et o f  
E x  �c . 
As b ef o r e , it is d e s ir ab l e  t o  inqu ire whether The o r em 3 
r emains valid i f we further r e s t r i c t  the c l a s s  of exp e c t a t ions fun c t i on s . 
It is e a s y  t o  verify that i f · B is a sub s e t  o f � with a non-emp ty int erior 
and i f ¢ is n o t  inc ent ive c omp a t i b l e  on a set A£ E x �  which is  d ense in 
E x � then ¢ i s  n o t  in cent ive compat ib l e  on C = A n (E x B)  � E x B 
where C is d en s e  in (E x B) . Un f o r t unately mo st  of the in t e r e s t in g  se\ s 
of exp e c t at ions may not hav e  non-emp t y  int er io r s . For example , suppose  
i +l 1jJ E � • That
of The o r em 3 .
i s , ljJ
i 
: E i + M+ (Zi ) . L e t �� b e  d e f ined as in the p r o o f
. h , , , i  � \H+i � 0 h � , . ,+i It is t r u e  t at � o r f o r  all u > • T e r e o r e , r 
d o e s  not have a non- emp ty int er io r  in � - Lu ckily , a non- emp ty int erior 
,,__ __ 
i s  no t a necess ary cond i t j_on . Thu s we have the f o l l owing c o ro l lary . 
C o r o l lary 3 . 2 : 
* 
The or em 3 rema ins valid if Y is replaced by Y 
Y+ or � or Ye or by any comb inat ion of int ersect ions o f  the s e  s et s .
In p art icul ar , Theorem 3 remains val id if Y i s  replaced with 
2$ 
or 
� n y+ n y* (the set of cons ist ent b e l i e f s  s a t i s fying an ind ependence
cond ition ) . 
Proo f : Firs t , it i s  easy t o  ver,ify that the proof  o f  the "only i f "
p a r t  o f  Theorem 3 surviv e s  if  Y is replaced b y  any non-emp ty sub s et . 
Second , i t  is a l s o  easy to ver ify that the proof  of the " i f "  part o f  
Theorem 3 survive s if  Y is rep laced by any non-emp ty sub s e t  B f or whi ch 
* the following pr oper ty is true : if there is i and e s E such that ( i) 
i * i  *i 
\Ju . • 17i<P (e  , z  ) I 0 and ( ii) if l/J s B and J17ui * i i i * i 17
.
<P ( e , z  ) dl/J ( e  ) 
l . 
then for any n e i ghb orhood N o f  l/J in B ,  there is 1/)i s N su ch that
fllui 17 . <P ( e* i , z i ) di)f ( e;' i)  # 0 .
) l 
* 
Let l/J E Y s a t i s f y  the cond it ion that there is i and e s E 
such that ( i )  and ( i i )  are t rue . By cont inuity ( i) holds on an op en 
. 
* . ne ighb orhood N S  Z1 o f  z 1 Let h : Z i + IR b e  any cont inuous non-negat ive
funct io"; such that f N h ( z i) dz i = 1 .  (The se are easy t o  cons truct s in c e 
i (n-1 ) },j  * i Z S. IR - . .  ) Let n s M ( Z  ) b e  d e f ined b y ,  f o r  all Borel s e t s  
B S.  Zi , n;, ( B )  = f Bh ( z i) dz i .  F inally l e t  1j;� ( ei) ( B ) = ( 1  - A) l)J \ ei ) ( B )  + 
* . 
0 
l.n (B)  when B is a Borel sub s e t  o f  Z1 • The fo llowing propert ies are true , 
, * .  . * .  . . 
whenever A s  ( 0 , 1) : ( a) if 1j;� s y · 1 ,  then 1j; �  s Y 1 ,  ( b )  if 1j;1 s Yc1 , 
i ci . , i c i  . i +i i +i 
t hen l/J;.. s Y , t n en 1J! ;.. s Y , and ( c )  if 1j; s Y , then ijlA s Y • 
It is also t rue that , if ( i) holds , and AS (0 ,1) , then 
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f i * i  i i * i  u 17i<P ( e  , z  ) dl)JA ( e  ) # O . There fore , the corollary is valid 
for Y� or y+ or Ye or any comb inat ion of inter s ec t ions o f  these . 
Finally , suppose  l/J s � ·  Then there is  TI s M ( E )  su ch that 
l)J\ei) TI C ·  l ei ) for all i and all e i s E i . By cont inu i t y  ( i )  holds on
* 
an open neighborhood N o f  e • Le t h : E + IR. b e a cont inuous non-negat ive
f f *
. 
. funct ion such that Nhde = l , and h ( e  1 , z 1) d z 1  > 0 ,  and let n (B) = 
f B h ( e ) d e  for all  Borel set s BS. E . Let TIA = ( 1  - A ) Il ( B ) _ +  AD* ( B )  for  Borei
i i i s e t s  BS. E .  Finally let  l/JA ( e ) = TIA C · J e  ) .  Then l/JA s RE . Further , 
given ( i) , f 17ui 17
i
<P ( e�\ z i) dl/J� ( e* i ) I 0 for A s  ( 0 , 1) . Thus , the
corollary i s  valid for � ·  Final ly , i f  l/J s y* or y+ or Ye then s o  d o e s
l/JA . Thus , the corollary is proven . Q . E . D .  
Remark :  The sub s e t  o f  E ,  with E 1  and A finit e ,  that i s  o f  interest
t o  S o c ial Choice theor i s t s  i s  not covered by Theorem 3 o r  it s corollaries , 
s ince A . 3  will n o t  hold for this class o f  environments . In part icular , 
the derivat ives Vu
i 
and 17 . <P  a.re n o t  even defined . 
l 
One can summariz e the result s o f  this s e c t ion in a s ingle 
* 
s ent ence . S ince for mo s t mechanisms we know o f  E<P is nowhere d ense , 
we mu s t  conclude that , in s p i t e  o f  r e s t r i c t ions with respect  t. o 
d iffu seness or ind ependence of exp e c t a t ions , for• most  different-Zc'.ble
mecha.nisms and environments, incentive compatibility id Z l  usua Z:Z.y not 
obtain even if informa-tion is -incomp lete . 
3 .  C onclud ing Remarks
In this s ection we exp l o r e  s ome of the implicat ions o f  our
result s  for specific  env ir onmen t s  and mechanisms . 
A .  Ex ch ange Economies 
The theorem o f  Hurwicz [ 7 ] , that ther e is a neo-class ical
exchan g e  e c onomy such that no al l o cat ion mechanism � : E  + A with the
proper ties  that � ( e)  is Pareto-optimal in e and @ ( e )  �. ( ei) a
0 
(where a0 is the no t rade a l l oc a t ion) is inc en t ive c omp at ib le 
imp lie s , when comb ined with theorem 1 ,  that no such mechanism is
incent ive compatib l e  on neo c las s ic al economies  under incomp le t e
i n f o rmat ion . In part i cular , t h e  comp et it ive me chani sm is no t
incent ive c omp a t ib l e  o n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  neo c las s ic al economie s under
either comp l e t e  o r  inc omp le t e in f ormat ion . 
27 
The work of Mantel [ l O J  and o th er s c an be u s e d  to show that 
given the pref erences of one c on s umer and a price v e c t o r , p ,  there is
an e c o nomy w i t h  that c onsumer such t h at p is  the equilib r ium price . 
Thus , one can for  each e
i 
E E! ( the s et o f  neo c las s ic al character i s t i c s )
f ind z i  E Z i  ( p o s s ib ly varying n ,  t h e  numb e r  o f  consumer s )  such t h a t  the 
ini t ial end owment is  n o t  Paret o - o p t imal . It is a s hor t s t ep to show
* 
that E� = 0 if � is the compet i t ive p r o c e s s . Thus , the competitive
pro c e s s  is not incen t ive comp a t ib l e  on an open dense sub s e t  o f , s ay ,
+ - -;'� _j_ • c * � n '¥ n '!' or o f '!' '  n '!' or o f  '¥ • A s imilar conc lus ion wo uld fo llow , 
via the construct ion of Hurwi c z  [ 7 ] , f o r  any d ecent raliz ed me chani sm 
whi ch selec t s  Pareto- e f f ic ient o u t c ome s and gives  a "no-t rade" opt ion . 
Thus , under incomp let e in f o rmat ion , the lack of inc ent ive compat ib ility
is  generic for all such mechan isms . 
B .  Pub lic G o o d s  
Rob er t s  [ 1 3 ]  ext end s  t h e  r e su l t s  o f  Hurwi cz t o economies  with
pub l i c  g o o d s . I t  f o l l ows , as ab ove , that for any me chanism wh ich s el e c t s  
2 8  
Pareto-effic ient a llo c at i ons and which allows a "no-t rade" opt ion , the 
lack of incent ive compat ib ility is  gener ic under incomplete  in f o rm�t ion . 
Green-Laf f ont [ 3 ] , Hu rwic z [ S J , and Walker [ 1 5 ]  have d i sp ens ed with the
no- t rade opt ion and have shown that Par e t o - e f f i c i en t  mechan i sms cann o t  
b e  in c ent ive c ompat ib l e  on neo- c l a s s ic al e c onomi e s  w i t h  pub l i c  good s . 
Walker · [ l5 J has shown t h e  lack o f  incent ive comp a t ib i l i t y  t o  be g eneric
on a sub s et o f  tho s e  e c onomi e s . Thus , for at least a sub s et of neo-
class ical e conomies with pub lic g o o d s , a l a ck of  incent ive comp a t ibility · 
is gener i c for  all Pareto- e f f i c ient me chan i sms und e r  e i ther comp l e t e  or
incomp le t e  inf o rmat ion . 
C .  A "Paradox" 
The last s ent ence of the previ ou s s e c t ion s e ems to b e  in 
d irect opp o s i t ion to the r emarkab le result of  d ' Aspremont and Gerard-
Varet [ l ]  whi ch states that if  a mu tual c on s i s t ency requirement on prior
beliefs  i s  s at isf ied , then ther e exist  Paret o - e f f i c ient mechan isms which 
are in cent iv e c ompat ib le un d e r  in comp l e t e  in f o rma t i o n  on the class  o f  
neo c l a s s i c a l  pub l i c  go ods e c onomi e s  w i t h  t r ans f er ab l e  u t i l i t y . Mutual 
cons is t ency can b e int erp r et ed in the c on t ext o f  our mo del as r e quiring 
that 1/J E � n '¥+ , 
This ap p arent p aradox is r e s o lved by n o t ing that t h e ir 
definit ion o f  a mechanism allows @ t o b e  a fun c t ion o f  the probab i l i ty 
measure II E M(E)  whe r e  1/J i ( e i )  = II ( J ei) for all i and e i (when 1jJ E �) . 
Let R £. M ( E )  b e  the set  o f  II related t o  s ome 1jJ E � n '¥+ . Then their
mechanisms are func t ions* @: E x  R +  A .
* 
A s imil ar class o f  mechanisms is c ons idered by Meyer son [ 1 1 ]  t o
resolve a b argain in g  prob lem. 
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Returning t o  corollary 1 . 3  i n  which i t  is  shown that ¢ is  incent ive 
compatible  on � n 'I'+ if a . .  d only if on E ,  one sees  that this is proven
* 
J . . . * . by f ind in g IT E: R such that 17u1 • 17i<l> ( e 1 , z1 ) g  ( e ) d z 1 j 0 for some i . * * 
and e 1 where g is the c ont inuous density r epre s ent ing IT • This is 
J . * . 
* 
d one by showing that if 17u 117i¢g dz
1 
= 0 then one c an perturb n to 
Il0 such that f Vuil7 i¢g0d z i j 0 .  Some brief  thought will c onvin c e  one
that the ab ility to p r oduce the appropriate perturbat ion relies on the
fact that ui [ ¢ ( e ) , e
i
] is  invariant with changes in TI or g .  For the
broad er mod e l ,  where ¢ depends on IT we mus t  consider ( if d e f ined ) : 
(2) f 17 ui [ (l7 i¢) g ( s 1 , z i) + ( 17g<!l ) l7i g ( s i , z i) ]  dz i . 
J 
i i 
Thus , even though 17 u  • 17 i
<l> • g 0 d z  f 0 for . ·some o > 0 ,  
it may be t ru e .  that this e f f e c t  is j u s t  balanced by
J 17 ui • V g¢ • 17 . gdz i . 1 In fact , Theorem 3 . 3  in [ l] shows that there are 
<!> for  which this is true . Thus , for a l l  IT E R ,  ( 2) will b e  z ero when
evaluat ed at s
i 
e
i 
and <!l will b e  irrunune from manipulat ions o f  the form 
si j e i . However , it follows from the theorems in the previous sect ions
o f  this p fiper , s ince n depends on 'lj!
i and <!> depends on n, that <!> is  not
immune t o  "manipulat ions " in TI .
I originally conc luded in [ 9 ]  that the only way t o  avo id mis-
represen t a t ions o f  priors in the d ' Aspremont -Gerard-Verat mod e l  was t o
as sume that each agent knew a l l  o ther agent s '  priors but that this
as sump t ion violated the s pirit o f  incomplete  informat ion and the c oncept
* 
o f  p r ivacy pres ervin
.
g mechanisms . 
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I a m  no longer convinced that t h i s  is a c omplet ely valid view 
• I 
but I st ill have s ome ques t i ons . S ince e1 sumn1ar izes  i s true beliefs  
(as  we ll as  t a s t e s , e t c . ) one  might claim t hat misrepres ent at ions in 
prior beliefs  can occur only throu gh misr epr esentat ions of e
i 
and no t 
o f IT .  .Thus , given IT the theorem o f  d ' Aspremont and Ger ard-Ver at could 
b e  int erpreted as e s t ab l i shing that , f o r  the ir mechanism , misrepre sent a-
t ions of beliefs  and preferences are unpr o f i t able  for  all agent s .  How-
ever , one remaining unanswered que s t ion is : how is IT "known" by all 
agent s ,  inc lud ing the " c.ent er"  and why c an ' t  TI b e  man ipulat ed ? Two 
j u s t if icat ions of cons i s t ency are present ed at the end of [ l ] , but this 
quest ion is never really c onfronted . 
A generous int erpretat ion o f  the o r igin o f  TI ,  which can b e
found i n  Hars ayani [ 5 ] , is  that it inc orporat es  a l l  t h e  relevant infor­
mat ion and beliefs of  a well-informed outside ob server
t 
and that each 
agent is  such an ob server pr ior t o  his d i scovery o f  his  special inf orma­
t ion e
i
. 
Thu s in a real s ense , each i is assumed t o  know E ::: E 1 x . . •  x En 
and IT E M (E)  and to agree on this knowled ge . I f  this is the case ,  then
* 
As presented by Hurwicz in [ 6 ]  and [ 7 ] , a mechanism is privacy
pres erving if the outcome depends s o lely on t he reported informat ion of
the agent s (a non-parametric outcome) . 
t
it is not at all  clear to me how one places the beliefs of an 
out s ide ob s erver on the s ame found ations as the belie f s  o f  a d e c i s ion 
maker , as has b een d on e  by S avage and other s . 
_ _  
3 1  
<!> can depend o n  II and II c annot b e  manipulated . 
On t h e  o ther han d , i f  agre emen t  on IT is arrived at t hrough 
p a s t  exp erience or s ome o t her f o rm of communicat ion t hen Ti c an b e 
manipulat ed s ince agen t s  c an gain by ac t in g  as if their b e l ie f s  are
i� i  i ( -i * i i i � ins t ead o f \)! whenever i u � [ <!> ( e , II (ijJ ) ) , e ] dw ( e ) > 
J . 
ui [ ([l (e , IT (\j!) ) ,  ei ] d l/ (ei) ,  where IT (ijJ )  i s the elemen t o f  M (E )
tl"t<:t ( e i) � II ( " i f o r- a11 i and e �
ln this c:ase the i.nceru : iv2 c omp a t ib ility s imply ar i s e s  at an 
ear l ier s tage o f  the all o c a t ion p r o c es s .. It r emains an o p en quest ion , 
,in my mind , whether t he r e  is a j u s t if icat ion f o r  un iver s a l  agr e emen t on
TI wh i ch does n o t  s i.mp ly a s s ume away the p o t en t i a l s  for man ipulat ion 
imp l i c i t  in any f orm of <l i s c: overy through commun ication .. 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
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